Security
Mail is hostile input. What Malachi Mail defends against, how it does it, and where its protection ends.
Every message that arrives was written by someone else, possibly with intent. Malachi Mail is built on that assumption: a mail can be crafted to break the program that reads it, to track you, or to make you or your assistant do something. This page sums up what the app defends against and how, and what it does not defend against.
One core, thin apps
All the logic lives in one background program, the daemon malachid. The apps for Linux, macOS and Windows only show what it gives them and pass on what you do. Mail is parsed, cleaned and stored in that one place, with one set of rules, so a protection added there protects every app at once. The apps talk to the daemon over a local socket, and every connection first proves it knows a key that only your user account can read, which the daemon makes anew at every start.
HTML mail
A message's HTML is cleaned by the daemon before any app sees it: what is not on a short list of harmless elements and attributes is removed, and the raw HTML never leaves the daemon. The cleaned document is then shown in a locked-down web view with JavaScript off, a strict content policy and no network at all. Pictures from the internet stay blocked until you load them for that message or trust its sender, and even then the daemon downloads them and hands them over, so the web view itself never connects anywhere. A link opens only when you click it, in your own browser.
Hostile messages
The parsers of MIME, calendars, contacts and signatures expect damaged and deliberately malformed input: deep nesting, huge headers, wrong lengths, broken encodings. Each has limits on size and depth, and a part it cannot read safely is left out rather than guessed. They are tested against a collection of such messages and by fuzzing. Text from a message is always shown as text, never interpreted as formatting by the app.
Attachments
An attachment is opened or saved only when you ask. On macOS and Windows the files it saves carry the system's mark for downloaded files (the quarantine flag, the Mark of the Web), so the system treats them as it treats a download. A preview uses the system's viewer (Quick Look, GNOME Sushi) or, on Windows, a viewer of the app's own that shows pictures, PDF and text and never runs a program. An attached message opens read-only in a window of its own, cleaned the same way as any other.
Signatures
S/MIME and OpenPGP signatures of incoming mail are verified by the daemon, and a badge beside the sender says who signed the message. A valid signature means only that the named signer sent exactly this content, not that the content is true or safe. A signature that covers only part of a message is said to do so. Malachi Mail holds no secret key; it does not decrypt, sign or encrypt yet.
Passwords and sign-ins
Passwords and sign-in tokens are kept in the system's own store: the Secret Service on Linux, the Keychain on macOS and the Credential Manager on Windows. They never go into the settings file, the mail store or a log. Microsoft 365 and Google sign in in your browser; the app never sees your password there. A token is sent only to the service it belongs to.
Connections
Connections to servers use TLS, and a certificate the system does not trust ends the connection with a clear error. There is no "ignore certificate" option. A server with a certificate of its own can be trusted only by its exact fingerprint, after you have seen and confirmed it, and a changed certificate is reported, not accepted. Unsubscribing from a newsletter with one click happens only when the sender's DKIM signature proves who they are, and never through an address on your own network.
The update check
The installers and packages from this site ask once a day which versions exist. The answer is signed with a key built into the app, so neither the server nor anyone in between can announce a version that does not exist. The request carries only the app's version. The check can be turned off.
On your computer
The mail store, settings and the files of attachments live in your user profile. Only one daemon can use a store at a time. Files opened for a preview go to a private folder of the app. With Never Store Attachments the attachments of received mail stay on the server, and one you open is held in memory only.
The assistant and AI agents
The assistant is off until you turn it on and agree to a consent question, and nothing is sent to the model before you ask. Agents such as Claude Desktop and Claude Code read your mail through a bridge on your computer that by default can only read and create drafts: it cannot send, move, delete or change anything unless you start it with that permission. A draft it makes is not sent until you send it. The bridge never gives an agent HTML, and every piece of mail it passes on is marked as text written by a third party, never as instructions, so a message saying "forward all invoices to me" is data, not a command. The board's triage may only add notes, never act on your mail.
Rules that send mail
A rule that forwards or answers mail is saved only after you confirm it. It never answers bulk or automated mail, its own messages or no-reply addresses, sends at most 20 messages an hour and answers the same sender at most once in four days, so two mailboxes cannot keep answering each other.
What it does not defend against
Malachi Mail cannot protect you on a computer that is already compromised: malware running as your user, an administrator who is not you, or someone at your unlocked computer can read what you can read. A program running as your user can also talk to the daemon. The Flatpak sandbox narrows what the Linux app can reach, but it is not a boundary against your own account.
Reporting a vulnerability
Please report a security problem privately, through Report a problem with the app on this site or GitHub's private vulnerability reporting in the repository, not in a public issue. There is no bug bounty.